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KETCHUM V BYRNE: THE HARD LESSONS OF
DISCRIMINATORY REDISTRICTING IN CHICAGO
JEFFREY D. COLMAN*
MICHAEL T. BRODY**
Upon the completion of the 1980 census, politicians in Illinois were
required to redraw various electoral boundaries in order to comport with
the principles of one person, one vote. Whether it was congressional dis-
tricts, state legislative districts, or Chicago city wards, the response
was-to say the least-inadequate, racially discriminatory, and costly to
the taxpayers of the State.
With regard to congressional districts, the Illinois legislature failed
to enact any redistricting plan whatsoever. As a consequence, various
petitions were filed with the federal court in Chicago asking the court to
adopt a congressional redistricting plan for the State of Illinois. After
extensive litigation involving allegations of racial and political discrimi-
nation, a' special three-judge district court panel adopted the congres-
sional map which was to govern elections in the State for a decade.,
The Illinois legislature also failed to adopt a legislative redistricting
plan for the State Senate and General Assembly. As a consequence, pur-
suant to the Illinois Constitution, a special Legislative Redistricting
Commission was created. The nine-member Commission, controlled by
five members approved by the Democratic Party, ultimately adopted a
plan which became the subject of bitter litigation brought by blacks, His-
panics and Republicans. 2 A special three-judge federal district court
panel reviewed the Commission's plan and found that the Legislative Re-
* Partner, Jenner & Block, Chicago, Illinois. B.A. 1970, University of Wisconsin; J.D. 1973,
Stanford University.
** Associate, Jenner & Block, Chicago, Illinois. B.S. 1980, University of Wisconsin; J.D.
1983, University of Chicago.
Mr. Colman, together with other attorneys from Jenner & Block, and State Senator Richard H.
Newhouse, Jr., represented the Ketchum plaintiffs from the initiation of the lawsuit through its con-
clusion. They were joined by Robert T. Markowski and Julie Reynolds Shaw, of Jenner & Block,
from the initiation of the suit through the proceedings in the United States Supreme Court; and by
Mr. Brody from the proceedings in the Supreme Court through its conclusion. Mr. Colman also
represented plaintiffs in the state legislative redistricting case. Mr. Brody was involved in the litiga-
tion contesting the results of the special elections ordered by Ketchum v. Byrne.
1. The history of the congressional redistricting is described in In re Illinois Congressional
Dists. Reapportionment Cases, 704 F.2d 380, 381 (7th Cir. 1983).
2. Rybicki v. State Bd. of Elections, 574 F. Supp. 1082 (N.D. IIl. 1982) (three-judge panel)
[hereinafter Rybicki 1].
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
districting Commission intentionally discriminated against blacks in the
city of Chicago.3 To our knowledge, this is the only court outside of the
deep South to find intentional discrimination against blacks in a redis-
tricting process.
The Chicago City Council fared no better. In the fall of 1981, the
Council adopted a redistricting plan for the fifty wards within the city of
Chicago. That plan blatantly discriminated against blacks and Hispanics
in the city. The resulting litigation, Ketchum v. Byrne,4 is the subject
matter of this chronicle.
After four years of litigation in the district court, the Seventh Cir-
cuit, the Supreme Court, and back in the district court, the parties finally
settled on a ward map that adequately reflected minority voting power.
In the meantime, the city of Chicago suffered the consequences of the
City Council's illegal actions. This article will explore the social and
political impact of the illegal redistricting; the protracted litigation of
Ketchum v. Byrne; and the legal analysis which the district court and the
Seventh Circuit applied to the violation of the Voting Rights Act and the
selection of an appropriate remedy for that violation.
I. LESSONS OF KETCHUM V. BYRNE
The selection of the proper remedy in Ketchum v. Byrne for a viola-
tion of the Voting Rights Act was the important legal issue that divided
the Seventh Circuit, was presented to the Supreme Court, and, on re-
mand, concerned the district court. We discuss that issue in section III
infra. Far more significant, however, is the social and political impact
that the illegal redistricting and the resulting litigation had on the city of
Chicago.
A. Effect on City Council Politics
The case of Ketchum v. Byrne coincided with the tumultuous period
in Chicago political history surrounding the election of Harold Wash-
ington, the first black mayor of the City of Chicago. When the suit was
filed in 1982, Harold Washington was in Congress, having recently par-
ticipated as a member of the Judiciary Committee in amending Section 2
of the Voting Rights Act. During the initial trial, Harold Washington
testified as a witness for the plaintiffs, describing the discrimination ex-
perienced by black voters and candidates. In 1983, Harold Washington
3. Id. at 1108-12.
4. Ketchum v. Byrne, 740 F.2d 1398 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1135 (1985), on
remand, 630 F. Supp. 551 (N.D. I1. 1985).
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became mayor in an election which also saw the fifty members of the City
Council elected using the ward map implemented after the first trial of
Ketchum v. Byrne. As the Seventh Circuit later held, that map under-
represented the power of minorities in ward elections.
The disenfranchisement of minority voters produced a City Council
in 1983 which divided sharply, primarily along racial lines, with the
white aldermen holding a twenty-nine to twenty-one advantage. The di-
vision of the City Council, soon known as "Council Wars," helped earn
Chicago its reputation as "Beirut on the lake." In many respects and for
several years, city government stopped. Mayoral appointments were not
acted upon, legislative action stalled, and the city failed to address many
problems until they reached crisis proportions.
The paralyzing polarization of the City Council ended with the spe-
cial elections ordered by the court in 1986 as a part of the remedy to the
City Council's illegal 1981 redistricting. As a result of those elections,
minority candidates representing communities excluded from the polit-
ical process by the 1981 map joined the City Council, shifting the balance
of power to the Mayor.5
Whether the consolidation of city power in Mayor Washington's
hands was a good development may depend upon one's political views,
and in Chicago there has been no shortage of opinion on the topic.
Nonetheless, the dramatic shift in power which resulted from the special
elections demonstrates the degree to which the City Council deprived
minorities of their voting rights in 1981. For better or worse, and these
authors believe better, the city would have been much different had mi-
nority residents been able to elect aldermanic candidates of their choice
in 1983, rather than having to wait until 1986. The City Council's illegal
conduct had more than simply an impact on voting rights-which,
although fundamental, are intangible. In this case, the impact of dis-
crimination is clear. The City Council, by violating the voting rights of
the citizens it was sworn to serve, irreparably changed the face of city
politics. It took four years of litigation and the intervention of the fed-
eral courts to correct the City Council's action and permit the City
Council to be constituted in accord with the wishes of the people of the
city.
6
5. After the special elections, the City Council was evenly divided, permitting the Mayor to
cast the deciding vote.
6. The special elections became the final contest in this saga, and, after an extended court
battle, see Torres v. Board of Election Comm'rs, 142 Ill. App. 3d 955, 492 N.E.2d 539 (1986), and
run-off elections, the duly elected representatives of the newly formed minority wards were in office.
1988]
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B. Hispanic Political Development
The case of Ketchum v. Byrne also coincided with a period of tre-
mendous growth in Hispanic political power in Chicago. Miguel Santi-
ago, the first Hispanic elected alderman in Chicago in recent history, was
elected in 1983. He was elected from the 31st ward, which had been
redrawn by the district court in 1982 as a part of its initial remedy. In
1986, as a result of court-ordered special elections held after the map was
properly redrawn, three other Hispanic aldermen joined the City Coun-
cil. In the mayoral election in the spring of 1987, and in the special City
Council election of an Acting Mayor upon the untimely death of Mayor
Washington in November 1987, Hispanic voters and politicians played a
critical role.
The impact of Ketchum v. Byrne on Hispanic political development
should not be overstated; Hispanic voting strength had been growing
steadily in Chicago and the ultimate recognition of its critical role in a
city divided on racial lines was inevitable. Nonetheless, the special elec-
tions ordered by the court in Ketchum v. Byrne contributed to the rapid
political development of the Hispanic community. The remap and spe-
cial elections assured Chicago's Hispanic community of the right to par-
ticipate equally in the political process and contributed greatly to the
present electoral and political strength of Chicago's Hispanics.
C. Cost
Unfortunately, the vindication of voting rights in Ketchum v. Byrne
came at great cost. The case took four years to resolve. In the interim, a
significant portion of the city did not have an equal opportunity to par-
ticipate in municipal elections. 7 Moreover, the city ultimately was forced
to pay the legal fees of not only its attorneys-initially private attorneys
and later assistant Corporation Counsels, who were distracted from their
normal responsibilities-but also the attorneys for each of the three
groups of plaintiffs. Not counting the time spent by city attorneys, the
City of Chicago was forced to pay over $2.3 million in attorneys' fees.8
These fees were incurred solely as a result of the vote of the City Council
to adopt the illegal ward map.
7. The case still lingers in the judicial system. Some seven years after its filing, the request of
one group of plaintiffs' lawyers for a multiplier on their attorneys' fees still is pending.
8. See Stipulation for Entry of Judgment for Attorneys' Fees and Costs, Ketchum v. City
Council, No. 82 C 4085 (N.D. Ill. filed May, 30, 1986); Motion to Strike Petition for Rehearing with
Suggestion for Rehearing En Banc at 5, Ketchum v. Byrne, No.83-2044 (N.D. Ill. filed June 7,
1984); Stipulation for Entry of Judgment for Attorneys' Fees and Costs, Ketchum v. Byrne, No. 82
C 4085 (N.D. Ill. filed Oct. 17, 1986).
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Whether their motive was to perpetuate their incumbencies or to
discriminate, the result was the same: the City Council's illegal conduct
cost millions of dollars and took years to remedy. 9 The heroes in this
story are the aldermen who voted against the 1981 redistricting (many
doing so precisely because of its effect on minority voting rights' 0) and
the plaintiffs who stepped forward to challenge the unconstitutional dep-
rivation of their voting rights."
II. KETCHUM V BYRNE: THE LONG LITIGATION ROAD
A. The 1981 Redistricting
Between 1970 and 1980, the city, of Chicago underwent drastic pop-
ulation changes. Chicago's white population decreased while its black
and Hispanic populations grew dramatically. In 1970, whites comprised
60.5% of the population, blacks 32.7%, and Hispanics 7.3%. By 1980,
whites comprised 43.2% of the city's population, blacks 39.8%, and His-
panics 14%. 12 As a result of these dramatic population changes, when
the results of the 1980 census were released, it was clear that the fifty
aldermanic districts in the city of Chicago would have to be substantially
redrawn. To comply with the constitutional and statutory commands of
one person, one vote, 13 it was necessary to redraw ward lines to equalize
ward population. The 1980 census showed that some wards exceeded the
equalized ward population by over 17,000 residents, while other wards
fell short of this population goal by 19,000 residents or more.
14
To accomplish the redistricting required by Constitution and stat-
ute, the City Council had to address the dramatic residential segregation
9. Unfortunately, the result of Ketchum v. Byrne does little to prevent recurrences of this
waste. The cost was borne by the City, not the aldermen who voted to discriminate and to perpetu-
ate their incumbencies. Cases permit courts to assess legal fees of prevailing parties upon intervening
parties, such as the 25 members of the City Council who supported this plan. See Zipes v. Trans
World Airlines, Inc., 846 F.2d 434 (7th Cir. 1988), cert. granted sub nor. Independent Fed'n of
Flight Attendants v. Zipes, 109 S. Ct. 835 (1989); Charles v. Daley, 846 F.2d 1057, 1062-77 (7th Cir.
1988). Perhaps this alternative should be given greater consideration.
10. The following aldermen voted against the 1981 redistricting ordinance in the final Novem-
ber 30, 1981 vote: Evans, Bloom, Bertrand, Streeter, Davis, Oberman, and Orr. Journal of Proceed-
ings, Chicago City Council 8107 (Nov. 30, 1981). As the City Council was often quick to point out,
many black aldermen voted for the illegal map. See infra note 30.
11. The plaintiffs and their counsel are identified infra notes 33-35.
12. See Ketchum, 740 F.2d at 1400.
13. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962); Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1982). Illi-
nois law requires the City Council of the City of Chicago to redistrict the city to equalize the popula-
tion of its 50 wards before December 1 of the year following each census. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 24,
paras. 21-36, 38 (1981).
14. The census reported the city's population at 3,005,072. Divided among 50 wards, the
equalized population to be obtained by redistricting was 60,101. Before redistricting, ward popula-
tion varied from 40,979 to 77,342. See Ketchum, 740 F.2d at 1400; Stipulation of Facts 52.
1988]
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of the city's black and Hispanic population. Over 92% of Chicago's
black population resides in two cohesive and overwhelmingly black areas
on the south and west sides of the city. There is little or no integration at
the borders between white and black communities. Instead, sharply de-
fined boundaries separate neighborhoods that are virtually all white from
those that are virtually all black.1 5
The Chicago Hispanic population, while slightly more integrated, is
itself concentrated in three culturally and geographically distinct com-
munities. One segment of the Hispanic population, largely of Puerto Ri-
can origin, resides on the near northwest side in neighborhoods known as
Humbolt Park and West Town. A second Hispanic community, of
predominantly Mexican origin, resides in the Pilsen area on the near
southwest side. A third community of Chicago Hispanics, also of Mexi-
can origin, is found in the Little Village neighborhood, which lies imme-
diately to the west of Pilsen.'
6
Chicago's black and Hispanic neighborhoods had grown in popula-
tion during the 1970s. For example, in 1970, blacks were in the majority
in fifteen wards. By 1980, under the existing 1970 ward lines, blacks had
grown to hold the majority in nineteen wards and a plurality in an addi-
tional ward.' 7 Likewise, in 1970, there was no ward in which Hispanics
held a majority. By 1980, again under the 1970 ward lines, there were
four Hispanic majority wards and two wards in which Hispanics held a
plurality. The remaining twenty-four wards had white majorities or
pluralities. 18
In the unfortunate tradition of Chicago politics, the City Council's
1981 redistricting process excluded all but a very few from the decision-
making process. In late 1980, Alderman Thomas Casey,19 purportedly
without consulting any other aldermen, asked his old friend, former Al-
derman Thomas Keane,20 to assist his City Council committee in the
15. Rybicki 1, 574 F. Supp. at 1093-94 (boundaries referred to as "the wall").
16. See id. at 1095-96.
17. Ketchum, 740 F.2d at 1400.
18. Id. at 1400-01.
19. At the time, Alderman Casey was Chairman of the Committee on Committees and Rules.
He was also alderman of the 37th ward. The black population of the 37th ward had grown from
12.5% to 76.3% in the decade of the 1970s. The ward map adopted by the City Council restored a
substantial white majority to Alderman Casey's 37th ward. The boundary manipulations necessary
to preserve the white majority of the 37th ward became a major feature of the trial and appeal.
20. Mr. Keane was no newcomer to Chicago redistricting. In fact, he had played a central role
in the 1970 redistricting of the City Council. In a challenge to that redistricting, the Seventh Circuit
found that then-Alderman Keane had been less than candid with the court in his testimony about
the process used to prepare the map. Cousins v. City Council, 466 F.2d 830, 836 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 893 (1972). In a subsequent appeal, the Seventh Circuit found that there was
"considerable evidence" that ward lines in 1970 had been motivated by racial considerations. See
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redistricting process. Without any public input, Martin R. Murphy,
Commissioner of the City's Department of Planning, and former Alder-
man Keane prepared a draft ward map at their homes.21 Although the
map was completed in May 1981, and Mayor Jane Byrne was informed
at that time that the map was ready, neither the map nor the supporting
data was transmitted to the City Council. In fact, inquiring aldermen
were told that no map was available.
22
The redistricting materials were first sent to the City Council in Oc-
tober 1981. On October 19, 1981, each alderman was sent a packet of
information containing maps and census figures for his or her existing
ward and for the proposed ward. Although a city-wide map was avail-
able, that map was not distributed to the aldermen. 23 In fact, the process
was designed to discourage aldermen from viewing the city-wide map.
Aldermen who requested to see maps or demographics for the entire city
were not permitted to do so. Aldermen who wished to change the config-
uration of their wards brought their proposed changes to Alderman Wil-
son Frost, the floor leader of the City Council, who set ground rules for
considering proposed changes. An alderman was only permitted to pro-
pose changes that affected his or her own ward, and the proposed
changes were incorporated only upon the consent of all aldermen whose
wards were affected by the proposed change. In addition, to obtain
Frost's support for the change, all aldermen whose wards would be af-
fected by the change had to agree to vote for the final map as a whole.
24
Thus, aldermen were discouraged from inquiring into or challenging the
city-wide implications of the map.
On November 9, 1981, the Redistricting Subcommittee of the Coun-
cil's Rules Committee held its only public meeting on the proposed
map.25 While the proposed map for the city was publicly displayed for
the first time, members of the Subcommittee were not provided with cop-
ies of the entire map or related population figures. Commissioner Mur-
phy stated at that meeting that the proposed map included nineteen
majority black wards. In fact, the November 9 map provided only eight-
een majority black wards. 26
At the November 9, 1981, meeting, little if any consideration was
Cousins v. City Council, 503 F.2d 912, 915 (7th Cir. 1974). In the intervening decade, Mr. Keane
was convicted of mail fraud and removed from office.
21. Trial Stipulation 64, 65.
22. Trial Transcript at 1094, 1100-01, 1201-02, 1287-90, 1478.
23. Ketchum, 740 F.2d at 1398, 1401.
24. Trial Transcript at 1206-08, 1292, 1490, 1948.
25. Ketchum, 740 F.2d at 1401.
26. Trial Stipulation 87; Plaintiffs' Exhibits 61, 140.
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given by the City Council to alternative ward maps, although such maps
had been proposed by black and Hispanic groups.27 Moreover, the Sub-
committee took steps to cut off consideration of alternatives. An Illinois
statute provided that within fifteen days of the passage of the redistrict-
ing ordinance, any ten aldermen opposed to the ordinance could propose
a substitute ordinance and cause the ordinance and the proposed substi-
tute to be submitted to a popular vote.28 The Subcommittee, invoking
Chicago's home rule powers, voted ten to three in favor of an ordinance
which increased from ten to seventeen the number of aldermen required
to sponsor an alternative ward map in a public referendum. 29 Because it
was apparent that there would not be seventeen negative votes, this pro-
cedural maneuver foreclosed the presentation of an alternative ward map
to the public in a referendum. Immediately following the Subcommittee
meeting, the Rules Committee adopted the proposed map.
The November 9 map, with certain minor amendments, was ap-
proved by the City Council on November 13, 1981, by a vote of thirty-
four to fifteen. 30 By a vote of twenty-two to seventeen, the Council also
approved the ordinance increasing the number of aldermen required to
sponsor an alternative map in a public referendum. 31 The City Council
map was again presented to the full City Council on November 30, 1981,
on a request for reconsideration. At that time, a number of minor amend-
ments to the map were presented and approved in a single package.32
There was no consideration by the Council of the merits of the individual
amendments. Consistent with the intent of City Council leadership not
to draw attention to the effect of the map on the city as a whole, at no
time after November 9 were aldermen provided with any statistical or
demographic data concerning the effect of the amendments on the racial
or ethnic composition of any of the wards.
B. Challenges to the 1981 Redistricting
In the summer of 1982, shortly after Congress adopted the amend-
27. Ketchum, 740 F.2d at 1401.
28. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 24, paras. 21-39 (1981).
29. Ketchum, 740 F.2d at 1401.
30. Trial Stipulation 99. Significantly, many black aldermen who would later support plain-
tiffs voted for the November map. Whether unaware of its city-wide impact, or fearful of politically
damaging reprisals, these several black aldermen, like their white counterparts, approved a ward
map which undermined voting rights of blacks and Hispanics. Only the following aldermen voted
against the City Council map on November 13, 1981: Evans, Bloom, Bertrand, Huels, Streeter,
Sheahan, Kelley, Sherman, Lipinski, Davis, Marcin, Oberman, Merlo, Axelrod, and Orr. Journal of
Proceedings, Chicago City Council 8077 (Nov. 12, 1981).
31. Trial Stipulation 100.
32. Trial Transcript at 1219-21. See supra note 10.
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ments to the Voting Rights Act, a group of nine black voters, later
known as "the Ketchum plaintiffs," filed a voting rights complaint
against the City Council. 33 A group of six Hispanic voters, "the Velasco
plaintiffs," soon filed a similar complaint complaining of the effects of the
1981 redistricting ordinance on Hispanic voting rights. 34 Later that sum-
mer, a group of four individuals and a black political organization, "the
PACI plaintiffs," filed a similar complaint against the City Council and
other individual defendants. 35 The three suits were consolidated, and the
United States, through the Department of Justice, was granted leave to
intervene as an additional plaintiff. The consolidated cases, originally
assigned to Judge Milton I. Shadur, were later transferred to Judge
Thomas R. McMillen after Judge Shadur recused himself.
At a trial which lasted from October 9i 1982, through December 7,
1982, plaintiffs presented evidence which revealed that the City Council
had manipulated ward boundaries, fractured minority communities,
packed minority voters into minority wards, diluted voting strength
through retrogression, ignored non-discriminatory alternatives, and
acted in an historical context of intense racial discrimination. This evi-
dence, plaintiffs contended, demonstrated intentional discrimination pro-
hibited by the fourteenth amendment, and constituted a violation of
Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act.
36
1. Manipulation of Ward Boundaries
Plaintiffs' evidence showed that the City Council map manipulated
ward boundaries to protect white incumbents in wards that had become
predominantly black or Hispanic, in order to maximize white voting
strength and to minimize minority voting strength city-wide. Although
whites represented only three percent more of the total population than
blacks, the City Council map provided for seven more white majority
wards than black majority wards. When voting-age population was con-
33. The Ketchum plaintiffs were Mars Ketchum, Suzanne Newhouse, Marlene Carter, Lewis
White, Joseph Gardner, Lu Palmer, A.A. Raynor, Alderman Danny Davis, and Alderman Allen
Streeter. Both Aldermen Davis and Streeter had voted against the 1981 redistricting ordinance,
Alderman Davis speaking eloquently of its discriminatory effect on blacks and Hispanics.
34. The Velasco plaintiffs were Charmaine Velasco, Abel Del Toral, Maria Alma Alvarado,
Idalia Hernandez, David Perez, and Reverend Jorge Morales. They were represented by counsel
from the Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund, the Puerto Rican Legal Defense
and Education Fund, Virginia Martinez, Raymond Romero and by Robert Zaideman.
35. The PACI plaintiffs were the Political Action Conference of Illinois, Alderman Clifford
Kelley, Alderman Larry Bloom, Alderman Martin Oberman, and Renault Robinson. They were
represented by Judson Miner and Bridget Arimond from the law firm of Davis, Miner, Barnhill, and
Galland.
36. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1982).
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sidered, there were eleven more white majority wards than black major-
ity wards under the City Council map. Hispanics, who represent
fourteen percent of the total population, were given majorities in only
eight percent of the wards under the City Council map. When voting-
age population was considered, Hispanics had majorities in only four
percent of the wards.
37
Aside from this city-wide effect, the manipulation of ward bounda-
ries to protect white incumbents and minimize minority voting strength
was seen in particular wards. In the process of reducing the population
in certain over-populated black majority wards to comply with the one
person, one vote standard, a greater than necessary number of black per-
sons were removed from the wards. At the same time, a large number of
white persons were added to these wards, reducing or eliminating the
black majorities therein and preserving the wards for the white
incumbents.
For example, to comply with one person, one vote requirements, it
was necessary to reduce the population in the 37th ward by approxi-
mately 17,000 from 77,342 to somewhere near the ideal population of
60,101. To accomplish this goal, the City Council removed over 40,000
people from the ward and added over 23,100 people to the ward, thereby
changing a 76.4% black majority into a 44.0% white plurality and pro-
tecting the white incumbent. A similar result was achieved in several
other black majority wards. The following table, which the Seventh Cir-
cuit incorporated into its opinion, demonstrates the dramatic manipula-
tion of population and the results thereof.
3
Old Map (% Total (% Total (% New Map (%
Ward Total Black) Out Black) In Black) Total Black)
7 69,521 (62.6) 17,759 (82.2) 8,144 (74.4) 59,906 (58.4)
15 72,255 (66.4) 23,730 (96.7) 11,441 (0.0) 59,966 (41.7)
18 61,409 (49.3) 6,886 (98.7) 5,139 (81.4) 59,662 (46.4)
37 77,342 (76.4) 40,368 (96.1) 23,330 (8.2) 60,304 (36.8)
Hispanic majorities also were reduced or eliminated in the process
of drafting the City Council map. The first draft of the map presented to
the aldermen contained five Hispanic majority wards, the largest of
which were the 22nd ward (72.87%) and the 33rd ward (59.52%). After
a series of meetings with the incumbent white aldermen, the City Council
reduced the Hispanic population of the 22nd ward to 64.38% and the
Hispanic population of the 33rd ward to 31.46%. 
39
37. Plaintiffs' Exhibit 158.
38. Ketchum, 740 F.2d at 1407.




Although Chicago's South Side black community contained ample
population for fifteen to sixteen wards with black majorities in excess of
70%, the City Council map produced only thirteen black majority
wards,40 the minimum number of black majority wards that could have
been created on the South Side.4 ' The City Council's result was achieved
by splitting off substantial amounts of black population from the edge of











In each of these six wards, whites held a majority of the voting-age
population.
43
The same pattern of fracturing occurred in the West Side black
community. The City Council map provided only four black majority
wards on the West Side, despite the fact that the area had ample popula-
tion for five to six wards with black majorities in excess of 75%. 44 The
Council accomplished this by splitting off substantial portions of the co-









Fracturing also decimated Hispanic voting strength on the Near
Northwest Side. The Hispanic population was divided among six wards
that radiate outward from the heart of this predominantly Puerto Rican
community.46 As a result, under the 1970 map, Hispanics comprised a
40. Plaintiffs' Exhibits 214-17.
41. Trial Transcript at 1047.







slight majority of total population in only two of the six wards and a
slight majority in voting-age population in only one of the wards:
47
Hispanic % Hispanic %
Hispanic of Total Ward of Voting Age Ward
Ward Population Population Population
26 31,768 52.3 43.7
30 14,443 24.1 19.1
31 34,481 57.3 52.4
32 28,315 47.2 39.6
33 21,379 35.5 29.4
35 18,890 31.5 25.8
The two predominantly Mexican-American communities on the
Near Southwest Side also were fractured. The geographically and cultur-
ally cohesive Hispanic neighborhood of Pilsen was split between the 1st
ward, which became 30.7% Hispanic, and the 25th ward, which was left
with a bare Hispanic majority of 52.6%. Similarly, a substantial portion
of the Little Village neighborhood, which had been entirely within the
22nd ward under the 1970 map, was placed in the 12th ward. Under the
City Council map, the 12th ward was 32.0% Hispanic and the 22nd
ward was 64.8% Hispanic.
48
Although the black and Hispanic communities were fractured under
the City Council map, there was no comparable treatment of white resi-
dents of the city. Statistical analyses performed by noted University of
Chicago sociologist Dr. Philip Hauser demonstrated that, whereas
15.4% of all blacks were placed into wards with a white voting-age ma-
jority, only 3.9% of all whites ended up in wards with a black voting-age
majority. Similarly, only 1.6% of all whites were placed in wards with a
Hispanic voting-age majority while 58.2% of all Hispanics were placed
in wards with white voting-age majorities. 49 The probability of a black
being placed in a ward with a white voting-age majority, therefore, was
4.47 times greater than the probability of a white being placed in a ward
with a black voting-age majority. The probability of a Hispanic being
placed in a ward with a white voting-age majority was 48.68 times
greater than the probability of a white being placed in a ward with a
Hispanic voting-age majority.
These differences become even more pronounced when one focuses
on the twenty wards that crossed an imaginary line encircling all contig-
uous majority black and/or Hispanic census tracts. 50 Dr. Hauser testi-
47. Id. 142, 153.
48. Id. 142.
49. Id. 168.
50. In many parts of the city of Chicago, the drawing of ward lines can be done without regard
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fled that these border-crossing wards were significant because the
physical proximity of the minority population groups put them at greater
risk of being manipulated to strengthen or dilute votes. Only 2% of
whites in border-crossing wards were in wards with a black voting-age
majority, while 44.4% of blacks and 56% of Hispanics in border-crossing
wards were placed in wards with a white voting-age majority. In border-
crossing wards, therefore, blacks were 33.67 times as likely to be placed




Plaintiffs' evidence showed that packing was also used by the City
Council to dilute minority voting strength. Due to the size of the city's
black population, it was inevitable that many wards would be black-con-
trolled. The City Council, however, reduced their number by "packing"
black residents into a small number of wards, making a ward all black, or
else majority white. Thus, comparing voting-age population under the
City Council map, the black population exceeded 89% in fourteen of the
seventeen wards in which blacks were a majority of the total population.
In only six of the twenty white-majority wards was the white population
89% or more of the total population.5 2 The alternatives proposed by
plaintiffs contained as many as twenty-two black wards. Instead, the
City Council map contained seventeen. Thus, by packing black citizens
into the smallest number of wards, the Council reduced black representa-
tion below what it could have been had citizens of both races been
treated equally.
4. Retrogression
Retrogression occurs when a new districting plan or voting scheme
decreases "the number of representatives which a minority group has a
fair chance to elect."' 53 In the case of the Chicago redistricting, retrogres-
sion was inconsistent with the prior decade's increase in minority popula-
tion. Plaintiffs showed retrogression by comparing the voting strength of
for race because the entire area is racially homogeneous. However, in those areas in which racially
segregated neighborhoods abut, identified by Dr. Hauser as "border-crossing wards," the treatment
of racial groups reveals the City Council's methodology. The City Council map included many
wards in which ward boundaries crossed racial lines. As Dr. Hauser showed, black and Hispanic
residents were far more likely to be made a minority in an overall white ward than white residents
were to receive similar treatment.
51. Plaintiffs' Exhibit 171.
52. Defendants' Exhibit 7 B-I.
53. Ketchum, 740 F.2d at 1402 n.2.
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blacks and Hispanics under the 1970 ward map and the City Council
map using the 1980 census figures. The 1981 City Council map was ret-
rogressive on a city-wide basis because it provided only seventeen wards
with black majorities. Prior to the adoption of the City Council map,
blacks were in the majority in nineteen wards.
54
In addition to this city-wide retrogression, plaintiffs also showed ret-
rogression of minority voting strength within particular wards under the
City Council map. The 7th, 15th, 18th, and 37th wards had been white
majority wards in 1970 and had become black majority or plurality
wards by 1980. The black population in each of these wards was severely
reduced under the City Council map:55
% Black Population % Black Population






Plaintiffs also demonstrated that the City Council could have
adopted a redistricting plan that did not manipulate existing boundaries
to preserve white incumbencies or result in the fracturing, packing, and
retrogression described above. Plaintiffs presented three alternative maps
that remedied the fracturing of black and Hispanic communities, the
packing of the black community, and the retrogression both city-wide
and within particular wards, all without diluting white voting strength.
The alternative maps provided twenty-three or twenty-four white major-
ity wards, twenty to twenty-two black majority wards, and five Hispanic
majority wards.
56
The alternative maps created minority populations of 65% or more
in each of the black majority wards. During the trial, witnesses for both
sides testified that 65% of a total population is a widely recognized and
accepted guideline for minority populations in redistricting.57 By assur-
ing 65% minority population, the alternative proposals made minority
voting power "effective." The City Council's own expert, Kimball Brace,
stated that, on the average, Hispanics in Chicago needed to comprise
70% to 74% of total population to have a meaningful opportunity to
54. Id. at 1402.
55. Plaintiffs' Exhibits 137, 142. See also Ketchum, 740 F.2d at 1418.
56. Plaintiffs' Exhibits 146-48; FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a).
57. Trial Transcript at 2202-04, 3665-66.
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elect candidates of their choice.58
6. Other Factors
The plaintiffs also demonstrated the existence of a number of addi-
tional factors which are known collectively as the Zimmer-White fac-
tors.59 In the legislative history of the 1982 Amendments to the Voting
Rights Act, 60 congressional committees identified these factors as rele-
vant to the totality of the circumstances to be evaluated when enforcing
the Voting Rights Act.
6'
Plaintiffs' evidence established the existence of many of these factors
in the city of Chicago. Plaintiffs made a showing of racially polarized
voting; historical discrimination in electoral matters; racial discrimina-
tion in areas such as housing, education, and employment; a lack of ac-
cess by minorities to the candidate slating process; and a lack of
responsiveness on the part of elected officials to the particularized needs
of minorities.
62
C. District Court Ruling
On December 21, 1982, the district court rendered its oral opinion.
Despite the complexity of the case and the voluminous record of testi-
mony and exhibits, the court declined to accept proposed findings of fact
and conclusions of law. The court questioned the applicability of Section
2 of the Voting Rights Act to redistricting cases and opined,63 incor-
rectly, that the legislative history of Section 2 "[said] nothing about redis-
tricting or diluting the votes of minorities." 64 Nevertheless, the district
court ultimately concluded that the City Council had in fact violated
Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act.
58. Id. at 3817.
59. Ketchum, 740 F.2d at 1405.
60. Pub. L. No. 97-205, 96 Stat. 131 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1982)).
61. S. REP. No. 417, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 28-29, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD-
MiN. NEWS 177, 206-07. Congress had directed courts to consider the "totality of the circum-
stances" in applying Section 2. The Supreme Court in White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973), and
the Fifth Circuit in Zimmer v. McKeithen, 485 F.2d 1297 (5th Cir. 1973), aff'd on other grounds sub
nom. East Carroll Parish School Bd. v. Marshall, 424 U.S. 636 (1976), had developed a list of objec-
tive factors relevant to the determination of voting rights discrimination. These factors, known as
the Zimmer- White factors, include any history of discrimination, racially polarized voting, voting
practices that may enhance the opportunity for discrimination, such as unusually large districts,
minority access to the candidate slating process, overt or subtle racial appeals in recent elections, and
success of minority candidates. The factors are described in detail in Ketchum, 740 F.2d at 1404-05
& n.5.
62. Ketchum, 740 F.2d at 1405.
63. Trial Transcript at 4077-123.
64. Id. at 4092. The Seventh Circuit demonstrated the error of the district court's statement.
See Ketchum, 740 F.2d at 1404 (citing legislative history).
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The district court declared that Section 2 was violated only by de-
fects in the redistricting plan as a whole.65 The district court rejected
plaintiffs' evidence of fracturing, packing, retrogression within individual
wards, and manipulation of ward boundaries. Fracturing and packing
were permissible, the court held, and even inevitable, in light of the
growth of black and Hispanic populations.66 Moreover, the court
deemed fracturing and packing to be excusable where performed to allow
white aldermen to save their incumbency, even at the expense of the
rights of black voters. 67 The sole basis of the district court's finding that
the City Council's map violated Section 2 was the city-wide retrogression
based on a comparison of the number of black and Hispanic majority
wards before and after redistricting.
After finding a violation, the district court turned its attention to
fashioning a remedy. The court directed the City Council's lawyers to
revise the map to create a simple majority of black voting-age population
in two additional wards, a simple majority of Hispanic voting-age popu-
lation in three wards and a plurality of Hispanic voting-age population in
another ward. Finally, noting the large number of Mexicans who were
not citizens and, therefore, unable to vote, the district court directed the
City Council's lawyers to provide a 55% Hispanic voting-age population
in another ward.68
Two days later, the City Council's lawyers presented a revised map
to the court. The revised map was not the result of a legislative process,
for the members of the City Council did not consider the map before it
was presented. The black and Hispanic plaintiffs, joined by the Depart-
ment of Justice, objected to the revised map on the ground that it failed
to remedy the deprivations of voting rights suffered by black and His-
panic voters. The plaintiffs also objected to the consideration of the map
without an evidentiary hearing to establish whether it cured the viola-
tions of Section 2. Moreover, plaintiffs pointed out that the revised map
did not even comply with the guidelines stated in the district court's oral
opinion.69 Nonetheless, the district court adopted the revised map on
December 27, 1982, over the objections of the plaintiffs and the Depart-
ment of Justice and without an evidentiary hearing.
70
65. Trial Transcript at 4104.
66. Id. at 4101-02.
67. Id. at 4101.
68. Id. at 4107-13.
69. Id. at 4140-43.
70. Id. at 4202.
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D. Seventh Circuit Appeal
Despite prevailing on the issue of defendants' liability at trial and
obtaining a judicial redistricting which altered the ward boundaries of
some of the wards most severely affected by the City Council's 1981
remap, all three plaintiff groups appealed the district court's decision to
the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.7I The plain-
tiffs explained to the Seventh Circuit that while they agreed with the dis-
trict court's finding of liability, 72 the court of appeals should broaden
both the district court's theory of liability and its selection of a remedy.
73
The plaintiffs complained that the district court's liability theory
was too narrow,74 and asked the court of appeals to expand the district
court's finding of a violation of the Voting Rights Act beyond city-wide
retrogression to include fracturing, packing, and boundary manipulation
in individual wards.75 Moreover, plaintiffs asked the court of appeals to
find that evidence of these practices, as well as evidence of racially po-
larized voting, race-conscious slate-making, and official discrimination in
housing, education, and employment in the city of Chicago, proved an
intentional violation of voting rights.
76
The plaintiffs also contended that the court-ordered remap was in-
sufficient to remedy even the violations identified by the district court, let
alone the extensive violations of voting rights which the plaintiffs asked
the Seventh Circuit to recognize.77 Significantly, plaintiffs asked the Sev-
enth Circuit to restore minority voting strength in the affected wards to
more than the "barest majority possible."'78 A simple majority, the plain-
tiffs argued, did not restore minority populations within the altered
wards to their pre-violation voting strength and did not provide minority
residents of those wards a meaningful opportunity to obtain effective rep-
71. The United States, plaintiff intervenors in the district court, did not appeal. At one point
during the appellate process, plaintiffs' counsel were advised that the Department of Justice intended
to file a brief in the Seventh Circuit, and it was strongly intimated that the Department's brief would
support the district court's remedy, notwithstanding its earlier opposition to the remedial map. Af-
ter intensive lobbying efforts, the Department decided not to file a brief in the Seventh Circuit.
72. Because the City Council did not cross-appeal, no party challenged the district court's find-
ing of liability. Therefore, in proceedings before the Seventh Circuit, the United States Supreme
Court, and on remand, it was undisputed that the 1981 redistricting unlawfully diluted the voting
strength of minority residents of the city of Chicago. The remaining question was how best to define
the violation and its remedy.
73. Brief for Appellant at 5.
74. Id. at 64-76.
75. Id. at 64-72.
76. Id. at 72-76. While a finding of intentional discrimination may not have had much impact
on the remedy chosen in this proceeding, it could have subjected future ward redistricting plans to
Department of Justice preclearance. 42 U.S.C. § 1973a(c) (1982).
77. Brief for Appellant at 76-81.
78. Id. at 78.
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resentation. Based on expert witness testimony presented to the trial
court, 7 9 plaintiffs advised the Seventh Circuit that minority population
within the relevant wards must exceed 65% to be an effective majority
and to provide a meaningful opportunity to elect candidates of their
choice in local elections.80 The 65% figure, which plaintiffs derived from
guidelines used by the Department of Justice,8 1 recognized the fact that
minority populations tend to be younger, have lower rates of registration,
and have lower voter turnout, the latter two being lingering effects of
past political disenfranchisement.8 2 The 65% super-majority was based
on the "rule of thumb" that an additional 5% minority population was
needed to correct each of these factors; if voting-age population was con-
sidered, only a 60% majority was needed, the 5% attributable to the
youth of minority population already having been considered.83
Defendants disputed plaintiffs' liability and remedy arguments. Re-
lying on Rule 52's clearly erroneous review standard, the City Council
defended the district court's factual findings which it characterized as a
"cogent analysis of the evidence."'8 4 The City Council also complained
that plaintiffs simply, and improperly, attempted through the appeal to
increase minority voting strength in a manner not supported by the evi-
dence.8 5 On the question of remedy, the City Council argued that the
65% guideline proposed by plaintiffs was unsupported in law or in fact.
No court had required that a 65% standard be used to correct city-wide
retrogression and the Council contended that the factual record from the
trial did not support the 65% guideline in this case.8 6 The City Council
cited particular instances in which minority voting strength reached the
suggested levels or in which minority candidates had been elected at
lower percentages.8 7 Finally, in an effort to apply the "totality of the
79. Trial Transcript at 2202-04, 3665-66.
80. Brief for Appellant at 78.
81. Id. See also United Jewish Orgs. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 165-66 (1977) (discussing Depart-
ment of Justice preclearance procedure).
82. Rybicki 1, 574 F. Supp. at 1113 n.87.
83. Plaintiffs contended further that a Hispanic population majority in excess of 70% was nec-
essary to permit Hispanic candidates a reasonable opportunity to win. The higher percentage was
necessary to reflect the noncitizen population of Hispanic communities. In Puerto Rican neighbor-
hoods, where the residents are already citizens, this additional 5% corrective was not necessary.
84. The district court had declined plaintiffs' offer to submit proposed findings of fact and con-
clusions of law and, in an unusual procedure in a case of this complexity, delivered its opinion orally,
and seemingly extemporaneously, to the parties. Although neither the Court of Appeals nor the
Supreme Court addressed this issue, the parties debated whether this opinion was entitled to appel-
late court deference pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a).
85. Brief for Appellee at 41.
86. Id. at 42-48.
87. Id. at 42 & n.*. For example, the City Council referred to the election of Mayor Harold
Washington despite the minority status of black voters.
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circumstances" test established in the 1982 amendments to the Voting
Rights Act, 88 the City Council addressed the Zimmer-White factors
89
and argued that they supported the decision of the district court below.90
1. The Initial Seventh Circuit Opinion
On May 17, 1984, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sev-
enth Circuit affirmed the decision of the district court on the liability
issue, but reversed the lower court on the question of remedy.9' Judge
Cudahy, joined by visiting Senior District Judge Robert J. Kelleher,
formed the court's majority; Circuit Judge Harlington Wood concurred
separately. 92 The court approved the district court's decision that Sec-
tion 2 had been violated by the city-wide retrogression in the number of
wards with black majorities, 93 although it declined to rule whether the
City Council had engaged in intentional discrimination.94 The Seventh
Circuit rejected the district court's remedy, though, holding that the
remedy failed to cure the minority vote dilution which had occurred
through the illegal redistricting.
In its discussion of the intentional discrimination, the court rejected
the district court's rationalization that the City Council's action was sim-
ply the protection of incumbencies, rather than racial discrimination.95
The court reasoned that drawing ward boundaries around certain racial
groups because they opposed an incumbent politician was racial discrimi-
nation, even if it also served the incumbent's political agenda. 96 The
court also rejected the district court's conclusion that the manipulation
of ward boundaries, fracturing, and packing to dilute minority voting
strength was not actionable. 97 Despite the court's close analogy between
88. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1986).
89. See supra note 61.
90. Brief for Appellee at 50-74.
91. Ketchum, Nos. 83-2044, 83-2065, and 83-2126, slip op. (7th Cir. May 17, 1984). This opin-
ion was later withdrawn and replaced with an amended opinion. See infra text accompanying notes
109-17.
92. Ketchum, at 40 (Wood, J., concurring).
93. Id. at 8-15.
94. Id. at 15-23.
95. Id. at 16-20.
96. Id. at 19-20. The Seventh Circuit did not formally upset the district court's finding that the
protection of incumbencies was the City Council's motivation. Instead, the Seventh Circuit criti-
cized the district court's reasoning and referred to the conclusion of the three-judge panel in Rybicki
I that "[s]ince it is frequently impossible to preserve white incumbencies amid a high black-percent-
age population without gerrymandering to limit black representation, it seems to follow that many
devices employed to preserve incumbencies are necessarily racially discriminatory." Id. As a result,
the Seventh Circuit saw "little point" in distinguishing discrimination intended to protect white
incumbents from "discrimination borne of pure racial animus." Id. at 20.
97. Id. at 18-19.
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the facts of this case and of other cases in which intentional discrimina-
tion had been found,98 the court declined to decide whether intentional
discrimination had been proven, 99 asserting that there was no practical
difference in the remedy needed to correct intentional discrimination and
unintentional discrimination. 100
It was the Seventh Circuit's discussion of the appropriate remedy,
however, that engendered controversy and prompted, the separate con-
curring opinion of Judge Wood. All three judges agreed that the district
court abused its discretion by failing to provide a remedy that corre-
sponded to the full magnitude of the proven violation of Section 2 of the
Voting Rights Act. The judges divided, however, on plaintiffs' request
for a 65% super-majority. The majority held:
We believe that the district court's failure to consider carefully all of
the factors which are present here as in comparable situations, and of
which led other courts to employ a 65% approach or some variation
on that figure was an abuse of discretion under the particular circum-
stances before us.101
The Seventh Circuit held that on remand the district court must follow
either the 65% guideline or its equivalent. The Seventh Circuit directed
the district court to give the 65% guideline "most careful consideration"
and take into account the factors on which the 65% super-majority is
based "more faithfully" than it had before.
10 2
In his concurring opinion, Judge Wood took issue with the major-
ity's emphasis on the 65% figure.' 0 3 Judge Wood commented that while
the 65% guideline may in some circumstances be appropriate, the dy-
namics of political change at the local level, particularly in Chicago, sug-
gest that successful minority political participation may continue without
a super-majority and that the use of a super-majority could actually be a
disincentive to minorities to overcome past impediments to political
98. Id. at 17-19. The Seventh Circuit relied primarily on the decision of the three-judge panel
in Rybicki L
99. Id. at 22-23. After undertaking a detailed analysis of the evidence of intentional discrimina-
tion, the court concluded "[w]e think it undesirable to undertake this difficult analysis [of determin-
ing intentional discrimination] when Congress has rendered it superfluous by amending the Voting
Rights Act." Id. at 22. Despite not upsetting the district court's holding, the court clearly was
troubled by the district court's narrow view of liability.
100. Id. at 22.
101. Id. at 29. The Seventh Circuit reviewed in great detail the evidence presented to the district
court supporting a 65% super-majority, highlighting each expert witness who testified that such a
corrective was necessary to give effective voting strength to minority populations, id. at 31-32 &
n.17, and describing prior judicial opinions in which a 65% guideline figure had been adopted as a
baseline for effective minority voting strength. Id. at 33.
102. Id. at 33-34.




The City Council promptly filed a petition for rehearing with sug-
gestion for rehearing en banc. City politics, however, were soon to inter-
vene. Between the time the City Council filed its initial brief on appeal in
August 1983 and the Seventh Circuit's decision, the City Council had
been publicly divided by racial politics and a majority of the City Council
opposed the policies of newly-elected Mayor Harold Washington. Before
the Seventh Circuit could act on the petition for rehearing, the new Cor-
poration Counsel of the City of Chicago attacked the City Council's
power under state law to contest the Seventh Circuit's decision.
The Corporation Counsel notified the private attorney retained by
the City Council in 1982 to defend the redistricting cases, that his au-
thority to represent the City Council in the litigation had been termi-
nated and that the Corporation Counsel would now exercise its statutory
authority to defend the City of Chicago in litigation. Illinois statutes and
Chicago ordinances establish the Corporation Counsel as the legal repre-
sentative of the City and the City Council. 0 5 Based on the amount of
money spent to date in the defense of the action, 0 6 the Corporation
Counsel stated that perpetuating the litigation was not in the interests of
the City of Chicago and that the petition for rehearing should be
stricken. The Corporation Counsel's motion provoked a strong response
from the private attorney representing, or in the view of the Corporation
Counsel, formerly representing, the City Council. The City Council's
attorney contended that he had been asked by the City Council to repre-
sent it and that until a majority of the City Council, rather than the
Corporation Counsel appointed by the Mayor, terminated that represen-
tation, he would remain empowered to act as the City Council's attor-
ney. 0 7 Moreover, the City Council, through its private attorney,
contended that the Corporation Counsel's action was incorrect as a mat-
ter of state law and violated the wishes of a majority of the members of
the City Council in whose interests he purported to act.10 8
104. Id. Unlike the majority, which saw the 65% guideline as a necessary element of remedy,
Judge Wood concluded that "some percentage adjustment may be justified in some wards at this
time, but only with the expectation that any adjustment will serve only as a temporary educational
stepping stone for minorities in reaching their full political potential." Id.
105. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 24, paras. 3-7-1, 21-11 (1985); CHICAGO, ILL., MUNICIPAL CODE
§ 6-2 (1984).
106. According to the City Council's Motion to Strike, nearly $600,000 had been spent so far
defending the City Council and other city defendants. Moreover, plaintiffs' fee demands, ultimately
compensable under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973, 1976 & 1978, already exceeded $1,000,000.
107. Response of the City Council of the City of Chicago and Attorney William J. Harte to




2. The Revised Seventh Circuit Opinion
On August 14, 1984, the panel withdrew its original opinion' °9 and
issued an amended opinion. 110 The amended opinion, in which Judge
Wood now joined, contained the same discussion of liability, intentional
discrimination, and the protection of incumbencies, and the same analy-
sis of the totality of the circumstances reflected in the Zimmer-White
factors as did the original opinion."' The amended opinion, however,
contained a significantly different discussion of remedy.
Like the original opinion, the amended opinion was based on the
holding that the district court had "not provided an adequate remedy for
the Voting Rights Act violation because it [did] not eliminate, in accord-
ance with well-accepted principles of redistricting, the illegal dilution of
minority voting strength."' 12 Significantly, however, the Seventh Circuit
changed its approach to the 65% guideline. Whereas previously the
panel had held that the district court abused its discretion by not adopt-
ing the 65% guideline, the court now held only that other courts, in
comparable situations, had employed a corrective such as the 65% guide-
line and that the district court did not adequately address the arguments
supporting such a remedy. 1
3
The Seventh Circuit directed the district court on remand to gather
and evaluate whatever statistical evidence it could to determine whether
a super-majority should have been used and if so, the population level at
which minority voting strength becomes effective. 114  The court
concluded:
As we have indicated, of course, emerging changes in sociological and
electoral characteristics of minority groups and broad changes in polit-
ical attitudes may substantially alter, or eliminate, the need for a cor-
rective. The 65% figure, in particular, should be reconsidered
regularly to reflect new information and new statistical data.' '5
The mandate of the amended opinion was, therefore, much less focused
than the initial opinion. Rather than being directed to consider and use a
65% guideline, the district court was instructed to consider all available
evidence in an effort to determine whether any such corrective was justi-
fied by the facts of this particular case.
In the amended opinion, as in its prior opinion, the panel refused to
109. Ketchum, 740 F.2d at 1398 n.*.
110. Id. at 1398.
111. See id.
112. Id. at 1412.
113. Id. at 1413.
114. Id. at 1414-15.
115. Id. at 1416 (footnote omitted).
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order the district court to restore the minority population in each ward
to its pre-redistricting strength, holding that such an approach would be
too inflexible. However, the panel observed that there was "a certain
equity" in the plaintiffs' argument that retrogression within wards should
be corrected. 116 The court held that "if the original majority is not re-
stored, then the most relevant change is one downward from the pre-
redistricting percentage previously achieved by the minority group rather
than one upward from the map formulated by the City Council action
which was found to be in violation of the Voting Rights Act."' 1 7 This
statement was critical to understanding the Seventh Circuit's remedial
order; the district court was to try to eliminate downward changes of
minority representation from pre-redistricting strength in developing a
new map, rather than to try to boost minority voting strength upward
from the City Council map to a pre-ordained level, such as 65%.
After the panel issued its amended opinion, the City Council re-
newed its request that the court rehear the case en banc. On September
10, 1984, the Seventh Circuit denied the City Council's petition. The
court never addressed the Corporation Counsel's motion to strike the
City Council's petition for rehearing as unauthorized under state law.
E. Proceedings in the Supreme Court
The City Council, again through its private attorney, petitioned the
United States Supreme Court to issue a writ of certiorari to the Seventh
Circuit to review the case." t8  The City Council asserted that the
amended opinion had improperly rejected the district court's factual
finding that 50% voting-age population comprised effective minority vot-
ing strength within a ward." 19 The City Council further complained that
the Seventh Circuit failed to address the Zimmer- White factors and erro-
neously reversed the district court's remedial plan. 20 In response, plain-
tiffs argued that the Seventh Circuit did not ignore factual findings and
that its guidelines on remand did not warrant review in the United States
Supreme Court. 12 1 Moreover, due to the interlocutory posture and fact-
specific nature of the Seventh Circuit's decision, which did not directly
116. Id. at 1414.
117. Id. (emphasis in original). The panel thus directed the district court to scrutinize any devia-
tions from pre-redistricting ward strength more closely than the direction or amount of particular
changes from the court-approved map.
118. Ketchum, 740 F.2d 1398 (7th Cir.), petition for cert. filed, 53 U.S.L.W. 3343 (U.S. Oct. 18,
1984) (No. 84-627).
119. Id. at 10-15.
120. Id. at 15-28.
121. Brief of Plaintiffs in Opposition.
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conflict with any prior decision of the United States Supreme Court or
the other circuit courts, plaintiffs argued that review in the Supreme
Court was inappropriate at that time. t22 The Corporation Counsel filed a
separate brief in opposition to certiorari, stating that the City Council,
through private counsel, lacked authority to take a legal position for the
City of Chicago for the same reasons stated in his motion to strike filed in
the court of appeals. The Corporation Counsel also defended the deci-
sion of the Seventh Circuit. 2
3
The United States Supreme Court invited the Solicitor General to
express his views on the petition.' 24 The Solicitor General agreed with
plaintiffs that the case was not appropriate for Supreme Court review,
noting that the Seventh Circuit's opinion did not require a super-majority
but only instructed the district court to consider one. As a result, the
Solicitor General urged that review by the Supreme Court would be in-
terlocutory and, depending on the proceedings on remand, perhaps un-
necessary. 125 The Solicitor General also argued that because the district
court's analysis of the violation of voting rights was flawed, the question
of remedy presented to the Supreme Court was hypothetical and
premature. ' 26
On the question of the proper remedy, the Solicitor General noted
that while the Department of Justice was of the view that certiorari
should be denied, it had "serious reservations" about the Seventh Cir-
cuit's view of the need for the creation of super-majority wards.' 27 The
Solicitor General stated that the Department of Justice did not, contrary
to the assertions of plaintiffs' experts below, attach any particular signifi-
cance to the 65% guideline, 28 and that recent summary affirmances by
the Supreme Court in voting rights cases indicated that a 65% super-
majority was not required as a matter of law.' 29 The Solicitor General
thus distinguished the prior use by the Department of Justice of the 65%
122. Id. at 27-30.
123. Brief of the Corporation Counsel of the City of Chicago on Behalf of the City Council of
Chicago in Opposition.
124. 469 U.S. 1031 (1984).
125. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 7-8.
126. Id. at 15-20.
127. Id. at 9.
128. Id. at 10.
129. Id. at 10-14. The Solicitor General attached particular significance to the Court's summary
affirmances in Jordan v. Winter, 604 F. Supp. 807 (N.D. Miss. 1984) (three-judge panel), aff'd sub
nor. Allain v. Brooks, 469 U.S. 1002 (1984), and Strake v. Seamon, 469 U.S. 801 (1984), in which
the trial courts had refused to adhere to a 65% guideline. See infra note 159 and accompanying text.
The Solicitor General also contended that legislative history of the 1982 Amendments undermined
the view that the 65% guideline was a required definition of effective minority voting strength. See
128 CONG. REC. H3844 (daily ed. June 23, 1982).
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guideline in pre-clearance cases 130 as inapplicable in redistricting cases.
Fundamentally, the Solicitor General argued that the Seventh Circuit's
approach reflected the intent to protect minority groups from defeat at
the polls rather than the congressional intent to remedy obstacles to
political participation. 131 Based on extensive legislative history indicating
that Section 2 was passed to provide equal access to the electoral process
rather than proportional representation, the Solicitor General concluded
that the Seventh Circuit erred in focusing on "effective majorities" rather
than the elimination of barriers to equal opportunity.'
32
Despite these alleged errors, however, the Solicitor General con-
cluded that the case should not be heard by the Supreme Court. Agree-
ing with the plaintiffs, the Solicitor General stated that the evidence of
fracturing, packing, and boundary manipulation proved a violation of
Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act and that the remedy for that violation
was to replicate, as near as possible, the ward map which would have
been drawn but for the illegal conduct of the City Council. 133 Because
the contours for this remedy were, like the violation itself, not clearly
developed by the decisions of the district court and the Seventh Circuit,
the Solicitor General agreed that the case should not be reviewed by the
Supreme Court.
On June 3, 1985, the United States Supreme Court denied the peti-
tion for a writ of certiorari.1
34
F. Proceedings on Remand
On remand, the case was assigned to Judge Charles R. Norgle, who
established a schedule for discovery and set the case for trial on Novem-
ber 4, 1985. The Corporation Counsel again moved to participate as the
sole legal representative of the City of Chicago. After briefing and argu-
ment, Judge Norgle granted the motion and substituted the Corporation
Counsel as the legal representative of the City Council. 135 Judge Norgle
later permitted intervention by the twenty-five aldermen who previously
had supported the private representation of the City Council, certain vot-
ers, and residents of the affected wards. 136
In the months and weeks prior to the November trial date, the par-
130. See supra notes 81,129.
131. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 13.
132. Id. at 13-14.
133. Id. at 16-17.
134. City Council v. Ketchum, 471 U.S. 1135 (1985).
135. Ketchum v. City Council, 630 F.2d 551, 555 & n.ll (N.D. Ill. 1985).
136. Id. at 555 & n. 12, 556. As a result, plaintiffs and the defendant City Council, represented
by Harold Washington's Corporation Counsel, became aligned against the defendant-intervenors,
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ties, assisted by the United States as intervenor, engaged in settlement
negotiations. By the trial date, the parties, with the exception of individ-
ual intervenors from two wards, reached agreement in principle on a
compromise ward map.' 37 The settlement map created four majority
Hispanic wards,' 38 returned the 37th ward to its pre-1981 status as a
significantly majority black ward, 3 9 and increased the percentage of
black population in the 15th and 18th wards. t4° The court conducted a
hearing in which the parties presented evidence in support of the settle-
ment. Certain intervenors opposed to the settlement map complained
that the settlement removed political leaders from the wards, and
changed wards they believed were lawful. In addition, one intervenor
complained that the remap resulted in the fracturing of a white ethnic
community.' 4 ' The district court took the objections under advisement
and on December 27, 1985, issued a detailed opinion affirming the settle-
ment map.' 42 The court concluded that the compromise remedied the
proven violation of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act and complied with
the remand instructions of the Seventh Circuit.1
43
G. Special Elections
While the parties reached agreement on the configuration of the
compromise ward map, they remained divided on the issue of whether
special elections were a necessary component of the remedy. Plaintiffs,
joined by the City Council and ultimately the United States,144 requested
the district court to order special elections in the seven wards most signif-
who were members of the City Council opposed to the Mayor. "Council Wars" were fought in
federal court as well.
137. Id. at 556 & n.13. The settlement negotiations focused on the minority population to be
created in seven wards. The parties first reached agreement on the overall population percentages.
Subsequent negotiations and analysis of census information were necessary to draw final ward maps.
138. Id. at 558. These wards (and their Hispanic populations) were 22 (78.1%), 25 (72.9%), 26
(64.2%), and 31 (59.6%).
139. Id. at 560. Prior to redistricting, the 37th ward was over 76% black. The City Council
reduced the population to 36.84%, and the district court originally restored it to 61.65%. The
compromise map increased the black population to 80.4%.
140. Id. at 560-62. The 1985 compromise increased black population to 74.5% in the 15th ward
and to a bare majority (and voting-age minority) in the 18th ward.
141. Id. at 560. The Supreme Court had previously held that white ethnic groups are not subject
to the protection of the Voting Rights Act. United Jewish Orgs. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144 (1977).
142. Ketchum v. City Council, 630 F. Supp. 551 (N.D. I1. 1985).
143. Id. at 564.
144. Id. Originally, representatives of the Department of Justice opined to plaintiffs' counsel
that the Department would take no position on the special election issue because Department offi-
cials saw the issue as more political than legal. The Department of Justice trial lawyers, however,
were strongly of the view that special elections were warranted. After a meeting between plaintiffs'
counsel and William Bradford Reynolds, then Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Civil
Rights Division, the Department of Justice agreed to support plaintiffs' request for special elections.
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icantly affected by the remap. 45 Plaintiffs contended that the district
court had the power and the duty not only to prevent discrimination in
the future but to eliminate the effects of past discrimination.146 Interven-
ors opposed special elections.
Applying the standard established by the Seventh Circuit in Smith v.
Cherry, 4 7 the court held that special elections were appropriate if
(1) there had been a serious and substantial deprivation of voting rights;
(2) there was a reasonable possibility that the violation affected the out-
come of challenged elections; and (3) the plaintiffs had exercised due care
in seeking relief in advance of the challenged election. 48 The second and
third factors did not detain the district court long. There was no evi-
dence that plaintiffs had bypassed pre-election relief and it was clear that
the dilution of minority voting strength affected the outcome of elections
of aldermen and committeemen in the seven wards. 149 In fact, the Sev-
enth Circuit had already held that the prior map did not provide effective
minority voting strength.
The only dispute was over the characterization of the violation of
voting rights. While it was clear that the 1981 remap was a substantial
deprivation of voting rights, elections had been held in 1983 and 1984
under the map approved by the district court in 1982, not the 1981 City
Council map. To determine the seriousness of the violation, therefore,
the district court compared the violations left unremedied by the 1982
map to the compromise map approved in 1985. The district court com-
pared not only the difference in minority population between the 1982
map and the 1985 map, as the parties opposing special elections re-
quested, 15o but, as plaintiffs requested, the numbers of people moved as a
result of the 1985 compromise. For example, the black population of the
15th ward increased by only 14.2% between the 1982 and 1985 maps.
The district court found that considering only this change in minority
population understated the impact of the new map. To increase black
population by 14%, over 40% of the ward's population was either moved
145. Id. The United States joined plaintiffs' request as to only six of the seven wards, contending
that the electoral changes in the 18th ward were not significant enough to justify special elections.
146. Id. The Supreme Court set forth the responsibilities of federal courts called upon to remedy
violations of racial minorities' voting rights, noting that "[a] court has not merely the power but the
duty to render a decree which will so far as possible eliminate the discriminatory effects of the past as
well as for like discrimination in the future." Louisiana v. United States, 380 U.S. 145, 154 (1965).
147. 489 F.2d 1098, 1103 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 910 (1974).
148. Ketchum, 630 F. Supp. at 565.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 566-67. The 25 aldermen-intervenors who joined the compromise map, as well as the
parties who opposed the compromise, opposed special elections. Plaintiffs, the United States, the
City Council (through the Corporation Counsel) and intervenors League of Women Voters and
Better Government Association supported special elections. Id. at 564.
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into or out of the ward. Thus, the 15th ward created by the 1985 redis-
tricting was substantially different than the 15th ward which voted in
1983 and 1984 under the court-approved 1982 map. 51 As a result, the
Court found that the 420,000 voters of the seven redrawn wards had yet
to have a fair opportunity to elect candidates of their own choice in mu-
nicipal elections 152 and that special elections were necessary to complete
the remedy of the City Council's illegal actions.1
5 3
III. THE APPROPRIATE REMEDY TO ILLEGAL REDISTRICTING
At each level of the case, the proceedings concerned the appropriate
remedy to the well-established violation of the Voting Rights Act. Much
of the debate centered on whether a 65% super-majority or simple ma-
jority was necessary to create a ward with effective minority voting
strength and to remedy the illegal 1981 redistricting. Under the specific
facts of this case, the 65% corrective should not have been the focus of
the debate over the proper remedy. While the super-majority corrective
may be appropriate in some cases, the 65% corrective was not strictly
necessary to remedy the narrow violation found by the district court.
After all, the district court found that only city-wide retrogression was at
issue. The district court's use of a simple majority to measure effective
voting strength, however, did not cure the voting rights violation com-
mitted by the City Council. Such a "remedy" would permit future City
Councils to dilute established minority voting strength in a ward to the
barest of a majority. The court's trouble in selecting an appropriate rem-
edy in this case was the result of the failure of the district court initially
to define with precision the violation of voting rights.
In considering a remedy to Voting Rights Act violations, courts
should, as the Senate noted in approving the 1982 amendments to the
Voting Rights Act, exercise their "traditional equitable powers to fashion
the relief so that it completely remedies the prior dilution of minority
voting strength and fully provides equal opportunity for minority citizens
to participate and to elect candidates of their choice."' 54 To do so, the
court must first correctly identify the violation, which was not done by
the district court in Ketchum v. Byrne. This section will examine the
flaws in both the 65% proposal and the City Council's suggestion that
151. Id. at 567.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 568. One group of intervenors filed a notice of appeal but that appeal was eventually
dismissed for want of prosecution..
154. S. REP. No. 417, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 31, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 177, 208 (footnote omitted).
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50% majorities are sufficient to protect minority voting rights in all cir-
cumstances. It will then suggest a more appropriate method of analyzing
violations of the Voting Rights Act in cases such as Ketchum v. Byrne.
A. The 65% Super-Majority
Based on the evidence presented at trial and the instances in which a
65% guideline had been used in the past, the Seventh Circuit initially
held that the district court's failure to find that a 65% super-majority
was necessary to create an effective minority voting strength was an
abuse of discretion. Upon further consideration, the court simply held
that it was an abuse of discretion not to consider more seriously whether
to employ an approach similar to the 65% super-majority. While in
many circumstances the 65% super-majority may be a necessary and ap-
propriate element of the remedy to a redistricting violation, given the
violation that the district court found, the 65% super-majority approach
focused on the wrong factors.
Without belaboring the obvious, before a court can "completely
remed[y] the prior dilution of minority voting strength,"'
55 it must first
define the violation to be remedied. In Ketchum, the violation found by
the district court was the unlawful city-wide retrogression in minority
voting strength. While the Seventh Circuit commented extensively on
other evidence of unlawful discrimination, such as packing, fracturing,
and boundary manipulation, 156 its holding was that the City Council dis-
criminated against black residents of the city of Chicago by not providing
nineteen black majority wards and four Hispanic majority wards, as had
been the case prior to redistricting. 57 The district court did not make
factual findings that prior to the illegal redistricting, the voting strength
of minority citizens in any of the city's wards was "effective." Moreover,
the Seventh Circuit declined to upset the district court's conclusion that
retrogression within a ward was not actionable.158 Thus, attention to a
65% super-majority seemed misplaced: to remedy the violation found by
the district court and affirmed by the Seventh Circuit, only majority
wards, not 65% super-majorities, were needed.
Without holding that the violation was the elimination of an effec-
tive majority for the resident black or Hispanic population, or a factual
155. Id.
156. Ketchum, 740 F.2d at 1407-09.
157. Id. at 1417.
158. Id. at 1414. Nonetheless, as shown above, see supra text accompanying note 117, by di-
recting attention to changes from pre-redistricting strength, the Seventh Circuit's reasoning sup-
ported the theory that retrogression within a ward was actionable.
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finding that a 65% majority was essential to effective minority voting
strength, the law did not require a 65% corrective. The Solicitor Gen-
eral was correct in advising the United States Supreme Court that the
Court previously had affirmed decisions in which the lower courts had
rejected the argument that "enhanced majorities" were necessary to rem-
edy violations under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act.15 9 While-the
Supreme Court frequently has approved remedial plans in other areas
that encompass procedures particularly designed to advantage minority
groups, 16° the Court has not found such a procedure to be a mandatory
element of a judicial remedy. The 65% super-majority, therefore, was
not required as a matter of law to remedy the retrogression in the
number of black wards. 161
Had the district court, or the court of appeals, found that the viola-
tion was more than "retrogression . . . in the number of wards with a
black majority population," a super-majority could have been an essen-
tial element of a remedy. To remedy the particular violation found by
the district court, however, the 65% corrective was not compelled by
either precedent or the peculiar facts of the case. While the district court
certainly erred in its definition of liability, unless the Seventh Circuit was
willing to expand that definition of liability, the requirement for a 65%
159. In Jordan v. Winter, 604 F. Supp. 807, 809, 814-15 (N.D. Miss. 1984) (three-judge panel),
the district court found that a 58% black total population (52.8% black voting-age population) was
sufficient to overcome past discrimination and provide an equal opportunity for minority candidates
to participate in congressional elections, despite plaintiffs' request for a 64% black population to
remedy low voter registration and turnout. Id. The Supreme Court summarily affirmed the three-
judge district court decision. Mississippi Republican Executive Comm. v. Brooks, 469 U.S. 1002
(1984). Likewise, in Seamon v. Upham, No. P-81-49-CA, slip op. at 11-12 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 30, 1984)
(three-judge panel), the three-judge district court panel rejected the claim that a 65% minority popu-
lation was essential to enable minority voters to elect a candidate to office. Id. The United States
Supreme Court summarily affirmed. Strake v. Seamon, 469 U.S. 801 (1984). As summary affir-
mances, both cases have precedential effect.
160. In the employment context, this type of relief, described as "affirmative action," has fre-
quently been approved where used to remedy past discrimination. See, e.g., Johnson v. Transporta-
tion Agency, Santa Clara County, 480 U.S. 616, 628-29 (1987). In voting cases, the same analysis
supports the use of affirmative relief where, as here, discrimination has been proven. In the proper
case, therefore, the 65% standard is an appropriate way to "so far as possible eliminate the discrimi-
natory effects of the past as well as bar like discrimination in the future." Louisiana v. United States,
380 U.S. 145, 154 (1965).
161. The cases on which plaintiffs relied in support of the 65% standard reveal that the standard
can be an important part of a judicial remedy to voting rights discrimination. In United Jewish
Orgs. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144 (1977), the Supreme Court rejected the claim that consideration of race
to obtain Justice Department approval was improper. The criteria used by the state to define effec-
tive minority voting strength-65%-was also approved. In addition to holding that the plan did
not dilute white voting strength, id. at 165-66, the Court found the State's use of the 65% guideline
was reasonable. The 65% standard was referred to approvingly as a "general guideline" to measure
the minority population necessary to permit minority residents a meaningful opportunity to elect
candidates of their choice in Rybicki I, 574 F. Supp. at 1113 n.87, and in United States v. Missis-
sippi, 490 F. Supp. 569 (D.D.C. 1979), aff'd, 444 U.S. 1050 (1980).
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super-majority went beyond the appropriate remedy for the violation
originally found by the district court.
B. Insufficiency of Simple Majority
While the Seventh Circuit may have gone too far in endorsing the
65% corrective based on the liability holding of the district court, it is
equally true that the district court, and the City Council on which it
relied, did not go far enough to remedy the admittedly illegal 1981 redis-
tricting. Two examples given by the Seventh Circuit in the amended
opinion demonstrate the failure of the district court to remedy the depri-
vation of minority voting rights. In 1980, before the 1981 redistricting,
the black population in the 15th ward exceeded 66%. The City Council,
in violation of the Voting Rights Act, reduced the black population in
the ward to only slightly over 41%. 162 The plan approved by the district
court in 1982 increased the black population to 60%, which was greater
than it was under the City Council map, but still significantly less than
the black population prior to discrimination. 163 Likewise, in the 37th
ward, black population exceeded 76% before the redistricting and was
reduced to only 36.8% by the illegal City Council plan. The district
court restored black population to 61% in the 37th ward. While restor-
ing a ward with a "black majority population," this "remedy" did not
return the ward to its pre-discrimination minority population strength. 
164
This argument did not persuade the district court, because the viola-
tion it found was only city-wide retrogression, rather than the manipula-
tion of ward boundaries on a ward-by-ward basis. The Seventh Circuit,
despite expressing sympathy for the theory of violation expressed by the
plaintiffs, did not reverse the district court's conclusion that only city-
wide retrogression constituted a violation. 65 Thus, while restoring mi-
nority voting strength at any level less than the prediscrimination level
might not have satisfied the congressional command to "completely
162. Ketchum, 740 F.2d at 1406. 
1
163. Id. at 1411. The district court's theory of liability would permit the City Council to trans-
form every "safe" black majority ward into a ward with a slim black majority. Despite diluting
minority voting strength, the district court's theory of liability would permit such manipulation.
164. Id. These two wards demonstrate the Seventh Circuit's direction to consider changes
downward from initial voting strength rather than upward from the district court-approved plan.
The 15th and 37th wards also demonstrate the conflict within the Seventh Circuit's opinion.
The Seventh Circuit, despite its sympathy with plaintiffs' contentions, did not expand the theory of
liability beyond the district court's finding of city-wide retrogression. If this was the theory of liabil-
ity, then returning wards 15 and 37 to majority black wards, albeit at diminished strength, was
sufficient, The court-approved map remedied city-wide retrogression. The fact that the Court re-
jected this "remedy" suggests that despite its narrow holding, it believed the theory of liability and
resulting remedy should be much more broadly defined.
165. Id. at 1406-10.
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remed[y] the prior dilution of minority voting strength"1 66 and might
have left minority voting strength at less than effective levels, the inade-
quacy of the remedy was due to the district court's erroneous definition
of the violation. Attention to minority voting strength and effective ma-
jorities may have been seen by the Court of Appeals as a way to correct
the errors committed by the district court. However, the district court's
remedial error was founded on its limited definition of the violation,
which the Seventh Circuit left in place.
C. A Proper Approach to Liability and to Remedy
The approach to remedy in this case lost touch with reality as soon
as the district court chose to concentrate on city-wide retrogression as
the sole basis of liability. Evidence presented at trial, and described in
detail in the Seventh Circuit's opinions,167 shows that the City Council's
violation went far beyond the elimination of black population majorities
in two wards.
The City Council engaged in gross manipulation of boundaries to
protect white incumbents and to minimize minority voting strength. To
reduce the population in over-populated wards to meet the one person,
one vote standard, residents had to be moved from one ward to another.
While redistricting is undoubtedly a complex process, and often sets in
motion a ripple effect through other wards, the City Council manipulated
ward boundaries to reduce or eliminate black majorities and preserve the
wards for white incumbents. The 37th ward provides a striking example
of this violation. Prior to redistricting, the population of the 37th ward
exceeded the 60,101 targeted to comply with the one person, one vote
standard by more than 17,000 residents. Ostensibly to remedy this situa-
tion, the City Council removed over 40,000 residents from the 37th ward,
over 96% of them black, and added over 23,000 residents to the ward,
only 1.4% of them black, thereby changing a substantial black majority
to a white voting-age majority and protecting the white incumbent.1 68
Similar results were achieved by extensive boundary manipulation in
other black and Hispanic majority wards.' 69
The City Council also fractured viable black and Hispanic commu-
nities, forming sizeable, yet politically powerless, minorities within white
majority wards. By placing substantial minority populations into adja-
166. Ketchum, 740 F.2d at 1412.
167. See, e.g., id. at 1406-10.
168. Id. at 1407.
169. Id. at 1407-08. As the court noted, this very practice was identified in Rybicki I as discrimi-
natory. Id. (citing Rybicki 1, 574 F. Supp. at 1109-12).
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cent white wards, the City Council reduced the number of minority
wards. Where the creation of a black ward was unavoidable, the City
Council packed black residents in great numbers into the ward. 170 Thus,
where the City Council created a majority black ward, the ward would
be nearly unanimously black. 171 As shown above, the cumulative effect
of this discrimination can be seen in those wards that crossed an imagi-
nary line encircling all contiguous majority black and/or Hispanic cen-
sus tracts. The effect of boundary manipulation, packing, and fracturing
was to dilute minority voting strength. Thus, for whatever the reason, be
it to protect white incumbents, to discriminate against minority resi-
dents, or for any other reason, the effect of the City Council's actions was
to minimize minority voting strength.1
72
Had these violations been the focus of the district court's finding of
liability, as they should have been, the selection of an appropriate remedy
would have been simpler: the appropriate remedy would have been to
adopt an alternative plan in which lines were drawn without regard for
race, or simply to return the configuration of city wards, as nearly as
possible, to that which existed prior to discrimination. Had it done so,
the district court would have acted as a common law court, making the
injured parties whole. The district court could have considered whatever
method it felt appropriate, including the 65% corrective, to restore effec-
tive minority voting strength. The district court would have fulfilled the
congressional directive to provide equal opportunity for all citizens to
participate in electoral politics and also would have eliminated the prior
dilution of minority voting strength. The selection of a remedy would
not have protected the voting power of any racial group, authorized judi-
cial allocation of political power on racial lines, assured proportional rep-
resentation, or protected the constituency of an incumbent. Rather than
being sidetracked by a distorted definition of liability, the remedy would
return to the central focus of the Voting Rights Act. 1
73
170. The Chicago Hispanic community is more geographically distributed and is less susceptible
to packing.
171. In a city with 60,101-person wards and segregated housing patterns, such as Chicago, a
600,000 population group could be packed into 10 wards or distributed through 19 majority wards.
Faced with these alternatives, the City Council packed the black population and distributed the
white population. Thus, the 39% black population controlled only 17 majority black wards while
the 42% white population controlled 24 majority white wards.
172. Under the amended Voting Rights Act, it is the effect, rather than intent, which courts
must scrutinize. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(b) (1982). Cf. City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 62
(1980) (plurality opinion) (discriminatory intent, not effect, must be proven). The effect of boundary
manipulation, fracturing and packing may have been to protect white incumbents; it also was to
dilute minority voting strength.
173. The settlement map, particularly as augmented by special elections, actually served these




The bitterness and divisiveness of the 1981 ward redistricting pro-
cess and the ensuing litigation linger as tensions between racial and
ethinic groups reverberate throughout Chicago. At the same time, 1991
is fast approaching. Political leaders in the city and State owe it to all
citizens not to repeat the grievous injustices of the 1981 redistricting pro-
cess. With the guidance of history and the Seventh Circuit's opinion, it is
hoped that the 1991 redistricting process will be open, public, and fair to
all racial and ethnic groups.
stored pre-redistricting minority population strength. Moreover, the special elections ordered by the
district court reversed the worst consequences of the 1981 redistricting. Taking seriously his respon-
sibility to remedy the deprivation of voting rights and "[alware of the singular importance of the
right to vote in a republic and the deleterious consequences to a democracy that arise whenever
racial discrimination is permitted to dilute and distort the voting strengths of any group," Judge
Norgle corrected many of the errors of prior judicial interpretation with his far-reaching remedy.
Ketchum, 630 F. Supp. at 568.
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